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institutional demands
Madalina Busuioc and Dovilė Rimkutė
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ABSTRACT
European Union agencies are crucial institutional agents of the EU regulatory
state. As such, they are faced with multiple expectations from a broad array of
audiences. Reputation literature teaches us that the process of how
organisations manage the expectations of their multifaceted audiences is
central to organisational reputation. However, there has been little research
about the diverse aspects of organisational reputation that EU agencies
communicate to legitimise their existence. And how does this vary over time,
across agencies, and why? More broadly, the study reflects on the
implications of these attempts at self-presentation for the regulatory state’s
legitimising credentials. It introduces a novel measurement of reputational
dimensions and draws on a quantitative analysis of all EU regulatory agencies’
annual reports across time. Our findings indicate that agencies are becoming
more reputationally-astute over time, expanding their reputational repertoire.
However, this expansion is consistent with the tenants of the EU regulatory state.
KEYWORDS EU agencies; legitimacy; organisational reputation; regulatory state; reputation-
management; self-presentation
Introduction
European Union (EU) agencies are crucial institutional agents of the EU regu-
latory state. Collectively, EU agencies’ inputs span the full range of the regu-
latory process from collecting and supplying technical information
(information-gathering) to rule-making (standard-setting) and supervision/
enforcement roles so as to ensure consistent and coherent implementation
of regulatory policy (behaviour-modification). To deliver on these mandates,
EU regulatory agencies are faced with multiple expectations from a broad
set of audiences, at different levels of governance, ranging from EU
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institutional actors (e.g., the European Commission, the European Parliament),
corresponding national regulators, national political actors, interest groups to
media, NGOs, or the general public.
Assessed by manifold audiences, EU agencies need to engage in complex
‘juggling acts’ to maintain support from their environment by responding to,
and prioritising among, an array of – often conflicting – audience expec-
tations. For instance, to perform their supervisory roles, agencies such as
the European Financial Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) need to display ‘vigor
and assertiveness’ (Carpenter 2010: 47) towards national authorities. At the
same time, EU agencies are heavily dependent on these very same audiences
– in terms of capacity, resources and expertise – to effectively deliver on their
mandates. Yet, we know little of how EU agencies reconcile the competing
expectations placed upon them within a multi-level governance system, as
well as how reputational management strategies reflect their complex insti-
tutional status.
Reputation literature teaches us that this process – i.e., how organisations
manage the expectations of multi-faceted audiences – is crucial to organis-
ational reputation and regulatory authority (Carpenter 2010). What legiti-
mates an organisation is a perception of competence (i.e., a positive
reputation) among audiences ‘that matter’, i.e., that are relevant to the organ-
isation’s reputation. In other words, when it comes to reputation-building, not
all audiences are equally of consequence. Formal, as well as informal, audi-
ences shape the power of regulatory organisations above and beyond
formal fiat.
However, there has been little research that speaks to the question of
which aspects of organisational reputation EU agencies communicate and
emphasise to legitimise their existence to relevant stakeholders. How does
the communication of different aspects of organisational reputation vary
over time and across EU regulatory agencies? Can different regulatory roles
(information-gathering, standard-setting, behaviour-modification) account
for their organisational reputation cultivation strategies? While the study of
regulatory communications in relation to bureaucratic reputation has been
a subject of growing interest (Gilad et al. 2015; Maor et al. 2013), these
aspects remain largely unexplored in the EU regulatory context.
To answer our questions, we carry out a quantitative analysis of all EU regu-
latory agencies’ annual reports across time (from the year of set up to the last
available report [2017]). To that end, we develop a novel operationalisation of
reputation-management strategies that agencies use to legitimise their roles
and day-to-day activities vis-à-vis relevant audiences. We introduce a unique
dictionary to capture the different dimensions and quantify their impact.
Empirically, we map out what aspects of their reputation EU agencies empha-
sise, how these vary over time, and why. We introduce and examine several
expectations accounting for the variance in reputation-management across
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time and as agencies age. Such an approach allows us to disentangle how
organisations operating in different regulatory areas attempt to legitimise
themselves during their lifespan and on which specific dimensions, providing
us with a more differentiated understanding of legitimation processes in EU
multi-level governance. Importantly, it allows us to study to what extent EU
agencies’ attempts at self-presentation are consistent with the discourse of
the EU regulatory state, or to the contrary, whether organisational pressures
are leading them to diverge from their declared raison d’être.
Organisational reputation
Bureaucratic reputation scholars have shown that successful attempts to
cultivate strong reputations bring crucial benefits to public organisations
such as regulatory agencies (e.g., Carpenter 2001, 2010; Carpenter and
Krause 2012; Gilad 2009; Maor and Sulitzeanu-Kenan 2013). The successful cul-
tivation of organisational reputation may build public support, further
agencies’ autonomy from political actors and/or help protect the agency
from external attacks (Carpenter 2010; Carpenter and Krause 2012; Maor
et al. 2013). Fundamentally, reputation-building efforts have been shown
to be intimately linked to the legitimation of regulatory power, and to the
deference and authority that regulatory bodies come to enjoy, beyond and
above legal fiat.
As a valued ‘organisational asset’, public organisations attempt to cultivate
a positive reputation. To that end, they carefully assess their regulatory audi-
ences and ‘court’ their support, emphasising specific competencies – for
instance, ‘niche competencies’ or those that place them in a particularly posi-
tive light (Busuioc and Lodge 2016) – and/or ‘selectively responding to repu-
tational threats that can potentially harm their distinctive organisational
reputation’ (Rimkutė 2018a: 72; see also Gilad 2009; Gilad et al. 2015; Maor
et al. 2013). Organisations adapt behaviour in light of audience expectations
as well as deploy rhetoric and efforts at self-presentation to shape not only
audience perceptions but also audience expectations of organisational behav-
iour. The ‘presentation of self’ (Goffman 1959), i.e., the management of
appearances to audiences – ‘[a]ppearing to be successful in a successful
way’ (Busuioc and Lodge 2016: 250) – is part and parcel of reputation-building
efforts.
However, successful reputation-building is no easy feat. Scholars in the
field emphasise the multi-dimensional nature of reputation (Carpenter
2010): an organisation does not hold a good reputation per se, but rather a
good reputation for its technical conduct (technical reputation), for effective
action (performative reputation), for following due process(es) (legal-pro-
cedural reputation), and/or for its commitment to ethical values (moral repu-
tation), as assessed by different audiences. Although the four dimensions of
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reputation are not mutually exclusive (i.e., organisations can cultivate more
than one dimension simultaneously), they are conceptually distinct.
Organisations may choose to cultivate their reputation by stressing their
‘scientific expertise’ and ‘technical’ aspects of their organisational conduct.
An emphasis on the technical dimension is regarded as a powerful tactic
enabling organisations to appeal to multiple audiences and even fight
against aggressive attacks by influential interest groups or other organised
actors (Maor 2007). To address their technical reputation, organisations
may, for instance, choose to send strong professional signals by emphasising
their scientific capabilities, underlining their scientific rigour, expertise, meth-
odological prowess, or analytical aptitude (Carpenter 2010).
The performative dimension pertains to an organisation realising its tasks
and ‘execut[ing] charges on its responsibility in a manner that is interpreted
as competent and perhaps efficient’ (Carpenter and Krause 2012: 27). The
capacity of organisations to effectively achieve declared ends and objectives
– to deliver on their mandates – can be a powerful tool to gain, maintain, or
enhance organisational reputation (Carpenter 2010). An important feature of
performative reputation also lies in the agency’s power to coerce some of its
audiences, to display sufficient strength and assertiveness in the pursuit of its
aims and declared duties. To that end, ‘the ability to intimidate’ is regarded as
an important characteristic of performative reputation (Carpenter 2010: 46).
An emphasis on legal-procedural appropriateness may also be an effective
strategy to foster a good organisational reputation (Carpenter 2010). Accord-
ing to Carpenter, ‘an organisation’s legal-procedural reputation relates to the
justness of the processes by which its behaviour is generated’ (2010: 47).
Organisations can attempt to placate audiences – that are unhappy with
specific regulatory outcomes – and legitimise said outcomes, through under-
scoring that these were reached through fair, predictable, and rigorous
procedures.
An organisation producing scientifically sound outputs, delivering on its
mandate efficiently, or following due processes may still, however, have a
dubious moral reputation. To cultivate this aspect of their reputation, organis-
ations may choose to pay special attention to protecting the interest of con-
stituents, members, users, or consumers: ‘Does the organization exhibit
compassion for those adversely affected by its decisions or those in its
environment who are less fortunate or more constrained? Is the organization
flexible with respect to human needs?’ (Carpenter 2010: 46). Organisations
focusing on the moral aspect of their reputation will attempt to demonstrate
their organisational openness, flexibility, inclusiveness, integrity, and/or com-
mitment to the public interest. Furthermore, to emphasise their moral and
ethical roles, organisations may send strong signals communicating their
commitment to prevailing social values.
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EU agencies and reputation
Ideally, to uphold a strong reputation, organisations would perform strongly
on all these reputational dimensions. Organisational realities, however,
suggest that delivering on all four dimensions would become a difficult balan-
cing act: focusing on one dimension potentially detracts from another,
leading organisations to prioritise among reputational dimensions rather
than attempting to maximise across all dimensions (Carpenter 2010; Carpen-
ter and Krause 2012). How do EU regulators prioritise among these
dimensions?
On the one hand, the EU regulatory state discourse presents an obvious
answer. At both the academic and institutional levels, the EU regulatory
state has emphasised technical aspects as the defining legitimation criteria
for EU regulators. The EU institutional-level discourse has stressed the
expert-based nature of EU regulators, leading to higher quality regulatory
outputs, as a key rationale for their creation: ‘The independence of their tech-
nical and/or scientific assessments is, in fact, their real raison d’être. The main
advantage of using the agencies is that their decisions are based on purely
technical evaluations of very high quality and are not influenced by political
or contingent considerations’ (European Commission 2002: 5). This rationale
has similarly been emphasised in the academic literature on the EU regulatory
state and EU agencies. As famously argued by Majone: ‘Regulation depends so
heavily on scientific, engineering and economic knowledge that (…) expertise
has always been an important source of legitimisation of regulatory agencies’
(1997: 157). And reiterated:
EU agencies are often created to answer the call for independent expertise of a
highly technical or scientific nature, not readily available in the Commission (…)
They are delegated the technical and scientific functions of the Commission,
leaving the ‘unbundled’ Commission to focus on the political dimension.
(Groenleer 2009: 101)
This emphasis is consistent with regulation literature, more generally. Much of
this literature conceptualises regulation as a technical exercise, where the reg-
ulator, much like a ‘technician’, can choose the optimal approaches from the
regulatory ‘toolbox’ to achieve desired outcomes.
On the other hand, EU agencies’ legitimacy and reputation are cultivated in
a context of a broad trans-national span of (political, professional, and lay)
audiences. EU agencies necessarily face up to different pressures and expec-
tations of agency activities and performance, depending on the coalition of
audiences interested in/affected by the agency’s performance. For all the dis-
course on de-politicisation, their areas of operation are often heavily politi-
cised. The European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) assessments on GMOs
and pesticides (most recently glyphosate), for instance, have been the
subject of heavy public controversy (Groenleer 2009; Rimkutė 2015, 2018b).
JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY 5
The ideological ‘camps’ consist of a mix of advocacy groups, EU political
actors, national authorities, and national political actors (dependent, among
others, also on the sensitivity of the topic in the national context) on either
side (see, for instance, Rimkutė 2018a). In other words, rather than strictly
neutral experts, organisational realities demand that EU agencies act as ‘pol-
itical entrepreneurs’ (Wood 2018).
How do EU agencies navigate the array of external expectations placed
upon them? Are their communications consistent with the formal institutional
discourse of the EU regulatory state or, to the contrary, are organisational
efforts at self-preservation leading organisations to depart from these? Are
we witnessing a move away from a focus on technical expertise toward
greater politicisation in terms of how EU regulators present themselves to
their audiences?
Expectations
As noted above, in the context of the EU regulatory state, expertise (the tech-
nical dimension of agencies’ tasks) has been a dominant justification for their
creation. Expertise becomes not only an important rationale for the creation of
EU regulators (Busuioc 2013; Groenleer 2009) but also a key ‘source of legiti-
misation for regulators’ (Majone 1997: 152). In line with this logic, we therefore
expect the technical dimension to be the core focus of EU agencies’ legitimation
efforts across agencies, and that this would be stable over time.
In line with the EU regulatory state discourse, we also expect the moral repu-
tational dimension to be, and to have been, the most under-developed aspect
among EU agencies. The moral dimension refers to the extent to which the
agency is compassionate and protective of constituency interests: ‘Does the
organization protect the interests of its clients, constituencies, and
members? Does the organization exhibit compassion for those adversely
affected by its decisions (…)?’ (Carpenter 2010: 46). Such an emphasis directly
contradicts the discourse of the EU regulatory state on de-politicisation: to
signal credible commitment, agencies are meant to embrace the value of
neutral expertise. They are meant to operate at arm’s length from political con-
siderations, guided solely by technical rather than political considerations
(‘not influenced by political or contingent considerations’, in the words of
the European Commission [2002: 5]).
At the same time, however, in light of audience multiplicity, Carpenter and
Krause (2012) have noted that focusing solely on one dimension might be
difficult for organisations. This rings particularly true in the case of EU agencies
and the (national, EU-level, and international) networks of audiences they are
faced with. This suggests that organisations might need to rely on multiple
sources of legitimation and satisfy multiple audiences at once and that with
time organisations become more reputationally-astute, i.e., aware of the
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need to cultivate broader support, beyond the immediate stipulations of their
mandates.
In this respect, insights from regulation literature – i.e., the life-cycle per-
spective (Bernstein 1955) – would lead us to expect that with time agencies
shift their reputational repertoire beyond the strict focus of their young
days. In Bernstein’s account, the regulator’s early days, characterised by youth-
ful zeal and campaigning for the public interest slowly give way to a regulator
that, as it ages, eventually settles in a pattern of ‘cosy’ relationships with the
industry. While the theory pertains to accounts of regulatory capture, it more
broadly also speaks to the relevance of a temporal dimension to regulatory
development/evolution: youthful regulators that begin with a strict interpret-
ation of, and adherence to, formal mandates, with time settle into more estab-
lished (and co-operative) patterns of interaction with their stakeholders. And
such accounts, have been empirically reported for EU agencies. EU agencies
interact with relevant actors in the environment and develop over time,
with varying success in this regard (Groenleer 2009). Bodies such as the Euro-
pean Environments Agency (EEA), for instance, which reportedly started off in
its early days with hostile, competitive relationships with the European Com-
mission – its main client and resource-provider – settled into becoming ‘a
more loyal partner to the Commission (…) balancing the ability to have a
credible voice on the one hand and the need for stability and secure resource
supply on the other’ (Martens 2010: 881).
Following this logic, we expect that with time agencies become aware of
their co-dependence with their environment and the need for (political)
support as a ‘licence to operate’, leading them to move towards cultivating
new sources of support, beyond their initial focus. We therefore expect that
a focus on the technical dimension, with time, will make way to a diversifica-
tion of their reputational repertoire. We anticipate that over time EU agencies
broaden out their reputational focus (by emphasising not only technical
aspects but also increasingly cultivating other dimensions such as performa-
tive and/or legal-procedural).
Following Carpenter and Krause (2012), we further expect task specialis-
ation to play a role in agencies’ reputation-management strategies. While
across-the-board we expect the patterns outlined above, at a more fine-
grained organisational level, we anticipate some more differentiated patterns.
Although all EU agencies are technical bodies, they carry out a variety of tasks
as identified in their basic regulation: Some agencies are advisory in nature
(provide scientific advice to the Commission without the ability to adopt
binding rules), others are decision-making (can adopt binding decisions by
applying general rules to specific situations: grant permits, approve sub-
stances such as medicines or chemicals), whereas others carry out supervisory
and enforcement tasks towards national authorities (see Busuioc 2013 for one
such task typology). We therefore expect that agencies’ reputational focus will
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reflect task specialisation/differentiation, i.e., that over time EU agencies carry-
ing out different regulatory tasks will be more skewed towards the reputa-
tional aspects aligning with their task specialisation, as specified below.
We expect advisory agencies to emphasise technical aspects of their repu-
tation (i.e., advisory agencies as the baseline category). The main output of advi-
sory agencies (e.g., EEA, EFSA) is scientifically-based information, analyses or
opinions, which the Commission or Member States can use for subsequent
policy-making. Such agencies collect and disseminate information and
assist the Commission in its regulatory tasks, particularly through technical
preparatory work on developing (or amending) EU legislation or informing
decisions of the risk manager (the Commission). Given that the main ‘cur-
rency’ of these bodies is their expertise and that they are heavily dependent
on the credibility of such expertise for it to be subsequently taken up by other
institutional bodies, we expect such agencies to ‘stay true’ to technical aspects
in their communications.
A sub-set of EU agencies apply general rules to specific situations through
their role in granting market authorisations or product certifications to the
industry (e.g., the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), the European
Medicines Agency (EMA) and in approving individual applications (trade-
marks: the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)). They adopt
decisions that are binding on third parties. In light of their tasks, we expect
such agencies to also emphasise legal-procedural aspects – i.e., that appropri-
ate procedures were followed and decision-making processes were fair. Fur-
thermore, as such tasks lend themselves to measurability – their outputs
are easier to measure/observe (Wilson 1989), we would also expect an empha-
sis on the performative dimension among these bodies: applications pro-
cessed, permits granted, etc. We therefore expect decision-making agencies,
compared to advisory ones, to emphasise legal-procedural and performative
considerations.
Agencies that carry out enforcement/supervisory roles are expected to expand
beyond the technical dimension to emphasise performative aspects. Agencies
such as the European Banking Authority (EBA), the European Maritime
Safety Agency (EMSA), the European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA) carry
out monitoring, inspection, and enforcement powers towards corresponding
national regulatory authorities (Busuioc 2013). The ESAs (EBA, EMSA, EIOPA),
for instance, can exercise far-reaching supervisory powers towards national
supervisory authorities such as being able to investigate breaches of EU law
and make recommendations for remedial actions to be undertaken by
national supervisors and, under exceptional circumstances, to address
binding decisions to these authorities as well as even being able to overrule
them. An important element of performative reputation, as discussed above,
is whether ‘the organization can display sufficient vigour and aggressiveness
in the pursuit of some of its aims so as to invite compliance’ (Carpenter 2010:
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46). We therefore expect such agencies to expand beyond the technical
dimension to more forcefully emphasise the performative dimension of
their reputation.
Sources of data
In the empirical analysis, we draw on the annual reports of EU regulatory
agencies to observe how they manage their organisational reputation over
time. Annual reports are an important (and thus far largely untapped)
source for mapping how EU agencies present themselves to a broad range
of audiences ranging from citizens (annual reports are publicly available on
agency websites) to institutional actors (reports are part of the budgetary dis-
charge procedure before the European Parliament and are formally required
to be approved and/or consulted by a set of internal actors – management
boards, agency directors – and external actors, such as the Commission, the
European Parliament, the European Court of Auditors, the Internal Audit
Service). Thus, all EU agencies produce comprehensive yearly reports covering
rich information about their plans and activities, which affords us comparable
data not only across agencies but also over time. At the same time, agencies
have room to manoeuvre in choosing which aspects of their core activities to
emphasise, allowing us to study agency specificities.
Moreover, these reports are relevant not only from an external but also
from an internal reputational logic. Reputation literature stresses the
‘difficulty of projecting a unified image or face’ (Busuioc and Lodge 2016,
2017; Carpenter and Krause 2012: 30) and the presence of competing
claims among different internal organisational sub-units. In this context,
annual reports are an ideal data source as they allow us to study precisely
these organisational attempts at projecting a unified common denominator
of ‘what we stand for’ despite their internal differentiation. Thus, annual
reports provide insights into how the organisation not only attempts to recon-
cile and unify ‘internal dissent’ (Busuioc and Lodge 2016) over the different
internal perceptions of an organisation’s reputation (as it contains contri-
butions from the main units of an organisation) but also how it chooses to
signal, what it prioritises – and how it reconciles – among different external
expectations so as to present a consistent image. Organisational reputations
are precisely about such efforts: ‘organizational images offer forceful simplifi-
cations of more complicated agency realities (…)’ (Carpenter and Krause 2012:
28).
We examine 20 EU agencies – the full group of EU regulatory agencies –
and a total of 335 annual reports, spanning the period 1977–2017 (see
Table 1 in Online Appendix for an overview of our data). Our definition of
regulatory agencies includes not only agencies possessing direct regulation
powers (i.e., enforcement and decision-making) but also agencies carrying
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out indirect regulation: i.e., providing information and advice to EU insti-
tutions (advisory agencies). This choice is motivated by Majone’s (1997) argu-
mentation that ‘regulation by information’ is as important mode of regulation
as direct regulation. These agencies can then be classified, according to their
primary regulatory roles, in three different task sub-categories: information-
gathering and technical advice, standard-setting, and supervision and enfor-
cement roles.
Operationalisation and method
Our outcome variables are the four dimensions organisational reputation –
technical, performative, legal-procedural, and moral – i.e., the prominence
of each of these dimensions in annual reports, as captured by the relative fre-
quency of relevant keywords for each dimension. To capture these dimen-
sions of reputation we built a unique dictionary of keywords. These
keywords were derived deductively relying on Carpenter’s (2010) definitions
(see Table 2 in Online Appendix for the full list of keywords). The keyword cat-
egory ‘technical reputation’ aims to capture scientific aspects of agency
conduct therefore words (and their derivatives) referring to the scientific/tech-
nical vocabulary were added: e.g., science/scientific, data, evidence, expert/
expertise, knowledge, study, model, test, calculate. We added adjectives
that have scientific connotations: reliable, rigorous, robust.
In the category ‘performative reputation’, words (and their derivatives)
reflecting the proactive or even assertive role of agencies in taking decisive
actions were included (e.g., deliver, improve, enforce, inspect, oblige, restrict,
adopt decision) as well as words referring to the attained ends (e.g., results,
achieved/achievement, objectives, outcomes, outputs, success, targets). Fur-
thermore, we aimed to capture references to adjectives and nouns such as
effective/effectiveness and efficient/efficiency, which, following Carpenter’s
operationalisation, pertain to the performative dimension of reputation.
Contrary to the performative dimension – exclusively focusing on organis-
ational ends – the category ‘legal-procedural reputation’ aimed at capturing
references to organisational processes (i.e., means) and the following of
rules/formal requirements that guarantee procedurally adequate courses of
action. To that end, words referring to legal and formal processes and pro-
cedures were included (e.g., protocol, rules, control standards, internal oper-
ations, provisions).
In the keyword category ‘moral reputation’, the aim was to include words
that refer to broader moral values and ethical aspects of organisational per-
formance and activities. Moral reputation, according to Carpenter (2010), is
often associated with organisational openness, inclusiveness, flexibility, trust-
worthiness, honesty, credibility, integrity, as well as activities aimed at protect-
ing consumers and users.
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Before proceeding to the analysis, we scrutinised – on a sample of reports –
how the theoretically-derived keywords were used. We examined our key-
words-in-context to ensure that they captured what we intend to measure.
This process resulted in the deletion of several keywords (e.g., fair, rational,
high-quality, guidelines, binding, control) that were not capturing our dimen-
sions accurately or those which were not mutually-exclusive. For instance,
keywords that seemed theoretically-relevant to the moral dimension (e.g.,
ensure, guarantee, preserve, promote) were also used by agencies to refer
to other reputational dimensions: e.g., the keyword ‘fair’ was used by agencies
to refer to legal-procedural and moral dimensions.
Following the keyword-in-context examination, to further ensure that our
keywords capture the dimensions as accurately as possible, we created
several ‘conditions’ in our software for keywords that were precise otherwise,
except when used in a specific word combination. The ‘condition’ function
allowed us to exclude the keyword when arising in specific combinations.
Examples of such conditions include excluding the keyword ‘data’ (one of
our keywords for technical reputation) when used near the word ‘personal’
or ‘protection’; ‘value’when used near ‘reference’ (‘reference value’ is technical
term, rather than our moral keyword ‘value’); ‘rule’ when used near ‘general’
(to avoid capturing ‘as a general rule’).
While we cannot claim to have been exhaustive in our keywords, our
focus was on the inclusion of theoretically-relevant keywords that
precisely captured the respective category, and which were also not sector-
specific in order to avoid introducing biases in favour of particular fields
(through inclusion or accidental omission). For example, while such a
keyword as ‘safety’ or ‘security’ would capture the moral dimension, it
would bias the result in favour of agencies that work on these areas such as
EFSA or Frontex.
While we count ‘mentions’ (‘words’), the specific keywords stand in for
‘units of meaning’ that can vary in size – we aim to calculate the incidence
of references to a specific reputational dimension (qualitatively, in the
actual document, one count will correspond to a string of words within the
surrounding context of the keyword, or sentence/paragraph, that disambigu-
ate the keyword). It is also important to qualify that a quantitative content
analysis approach cannot capture ‘nested’ meaning within sentences: if
agencies use ‘technical’ words to convey a ‘moral’ message our study
would not be able to capture it. On the other hand, while the analysis
might lose out in terms of ‘nuance’ behind communications, it does have
the advantage of being systematic and replicable.
To analyse our textual data, the WordStat software was used. WordStat is
a quantitative content analysis and text mining software suitable for
handling large amounts of word-based information. Using WordStat, we
obtained a frequency count for each reputational dimension, for each
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agency per year. The percentages obtained in Wordstat (calculated from the
total word count) as well as the actual word counts were imported in R to carry
out the analysis.
Below we first provide a descriptive demonstration of our data to examine
our first three expectations, which relate to trends in our four dimensions. We
proceed to test and elucidate the drivers behind each dimension. To that end,
we ran multi-level analyses, where we regressed each of the four dimensions
on age, age2 (we hypothesise a quadratic effect), agency type, and their inter-
actions (as the predictors), controlling for year. We used random intercept
linear regression models, using the lme4 R package (Bates et al. 2015). This
allows us to account for the variation on each dimension between the
different agencies within each type.
Empirical analysis and results
We begin by exploring descriptively the trends of the four dimensions across
time and agencies’ age. To calculate trends over time, we took the mean per-
centage of each dimension for the sampled agencies for each particular year
(we used the mean as the metric of the importance of each dimension) and
plotted these against time to display the distribution of the different reputa-
tional dimensions. To account for agency age, we plotted the average dimen-
sional percentage of count against existing agencies’ age, on a yearly basis.
For instance, data in year one would aggregate the dimensional counts for
EMA (European Medicines Agency) based on its 1995 report (EMA’s year of
establishment), EFSA’s 2003, ECHA’s 2007, EBA’s 2011 report. This allows us
to visualise and compare all four dimensional trends over time (Figure 1),
and as agencies age (Figure 2).
Figure 1. Dimension trends.
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Our aggregated historical time trend analysis of the EU agency annual
reports suggests that our first expectation holds: technical is the dominant
dimension, except in very recent years (Figure 1). The data indicates a domi-
nance of technical over performative, procedural, and moral aspects. A focus
on the technical dimensions was upheld by EU agencies until 2014, when per-
formative ‘just’ takes over (406 counts on average to performative’s 413
counts, see Online Appendix, Table 4 for specific counts).
Our data suggests that EU regulatory agencies started to pay more
attention not only to their technical reputation but also to performative
aspects when communicating about their activities. The plot shows a
clear diversification of focus beyond technical (Figure 1): There is a shift
towards more evenly distributed weightings, with a clear re-distribution
of focus towards a second dimension (i.e., performative), with a third
dimension (i.e., legal-procedural) too, on the rise across time. As expected,
moral is the least dominant dimension reaching on average, at its highest
in 2017, 83 counts over 20 agencies (1658 raw counts) (Online Appendix,
Tables 3 and 4).
The plot appears to be a good approximation of the trend (Figure 1): As we
move forward in time, and more agencies are created, there appears to be a
stable trend – as shown by the predicted line. It is important to note that the
early years fluctuate more due to there being fewer agencies in existence (pre-
2003 there are fewer than 10 agencies, see Online Appendix, Table 6 for the
yearly count). For more clarity, we therefore also present the descriptive
trends for individual agencies and how each of them manage their reputation
over time (Online Appendix, Figure 1a).
Figure 1, however, depicts trends over time rather than trends taking into
account a life-cycle perspective: i.e., adjusting for where the different agencies
Figure 2. Trends based on age.
JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY 13
are in their ‘lifetime’ to track evolution over time. To analyse if the same repu-
tation-management trends emerge when taking into account agency age, we
aggregated the data based on agency age (Figure 2). Contrary to Figure 1,
here there is less fluctuation in the early years (but more in the late years)
because there are fewer ‘older’ agencies – only four agencies in our plot
reached the ‘venerable’ age of 24 (Online Appendix, Table 5 for a breakdown
of agency numbers by age).
Here too, we see the same broadening out of focus from technical, to
include performative considerations. Both figures suggest that the broaden-
ing trend to include performative is consistent, regardless of whether we
examine it across time or in terms of age. Although the supremacy of technical
over performative is evident in early days, as agencies age (past year eight),
the two dimensions come close to parity making it difficult to distinguish
dominance, lending support, however, to an expansion in dimensional
scope. Performative seems to gain at the expense of procedural, which here
appears to go down as agencies age, compared to the overall trends over
time (Figure 1). It should be noted, however, that this particular trend – and
in fact the trends depicted in the right half of the graph (highlighted in red)
– past age 14, on the horizontal axis – are characterised by higher uncertainty
as the number of agencies drops to 10 or under (to seven agencies for age 17,
four agencies at age 24 onwards).
Next, we present the results of our multi-level analyses, which investi-
gate the variation in the four dimensions. For each dimension, we first
examined the effect of agency age, age2, and agency task type, controlling
for year (Model 1), and then added the interaction between task type and
age and age2 (Model 2), and additionally between task type and year
(Model 3). We present the full regression tables for each of the four dimen-
sions. For simplicity, in our discussion, we focus of the results on our main
explanatory variables – age, type, and the interaction between them.
Overall, the regression analyses confirm the patterns observed above
(Figures 1 and 2). They provide a more complete assessment of these
separate trends, as well as of the role of agency task. A descriptive
summary of our data broken down by type and age is presented in
Online Appendix, Table 7.
Performative dimension
The positive and significant coefficient of year, in Model 1 (Table 1), suggests
that overall, over time, this dimension became more emphasised, in line with the
descriptive demonstrations presented in Figure 1. The opposite signs for the
age and age2 coefficients suggest that the dimension also increases with age,
but that the increase is attenuating. This is consistent with the descriptive
age trends for the performative dimension (Figure 2). As for the agency task
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type, the main effect of enforcement, compared with advisory agencies, is
positive and close to significance (p = .13) (Model 1). The coefficient of the
decision-making type is positive, but insignificant. In Model 2, the interaction
between the two agency types and age are positive and significant, suggesting
that the increase over agencies’ lifetime is greater among decision-making
and enforcement agencies, compared with advisory, in line with our expec-
tations. Yet, when introducing the interaction with years, in Model 3, the inter-
action between decision-making agency type and age becomes insignificant,
indicating that the above moderation is related to historic time trends
rather than to agencies’ life-cycle.
Overall, our analysis indicates that enforcement agencies are more likely to
emphasise the performative dimension, and these trends increase over their
lifetime. A comparison between the models using ANOVA indicates that
adding these interactions (Model 3) has a significant contribution to the
model fit (Chi2(6) = 18.10, P < .01 and Chi2(2) = 8.08, P < .05 compared with
Models 1 and 2, respectively).
Table 1. Performative dimension.
Dependent variable:
































Decision-making × Year 0.044*
(0.024)
Enforcement × Year −0.086**
(0.036)






















N agencies 20 20 20
Observations 335 335 335
Log Likelihood −126.632 −121.620 −117.581
Akaike Inf. Crit. 269.265 267.239 263.163
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 299.778 313.009 316.561
Note: *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
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Procedural dimension
In Model 1 (Table 2), the effect of year is positive and significant, whereas the
effect of age is negative and significant. Consistent with the trends in Figures 1
and 2, these coefficients indicate that overall this dimension became less
emphasised over agencies’ life-cycle, but on the other hand, on average, it slightly
increased over the years. The main effect of decision-making type agencies,
compared with advisory agencies, is positive and significant, which entails
that on average, decision-making agencies are more likely to emphasise the pro-
cedural dimension than advisory agencies, consistent with our expectations.
The differences between enforcement and advisory agencies are insignificant.
In Model 2, the interaction between age and decision-making type is
insignificant, which entails that the difference between decision-making
and advisory agencies remains stable regardless to agencies’ age. The inter-
action with enforcement is negative and significant and the simple effect of
enforcement is positive and significant. The interpretation of this latter inter-
action indicates that young enforcement agencies are also more likely to
Table 2. Procedural dimension.
Dependent variable:
































Decision-Making × Year −0.010
(0.015)
Enforcement × Year 0.006
(0.022)






















N agencies 20 20 20
Observations 335 335 335
Log Likelihood 71.411 79.758 80.017
Akaike Inf. Crit. −126.822 −135.516 −132.034
Bayesian Inf. Crit. −96.309 −89.746 −78.637
Note: *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
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emphasise the procedural dimension, compared with advisory, yet as they age,
this emphasis diminishes. While we did not anticipate this in our expectations,
one explanation for this finding could be that as enforcement tasks entail,
among others, direct enforcement actions ‘on the ground’ (i.e., joint investi-
gation teams, rapid interventions teams – Europol and respectively Frontex)
or directing national authorities (i.e., the financial authorities), young enforce-
ment agencies might find it necessary to emphasise that they have followed
proper procedures to bolster the legitimacy of their actions.
In Model 3, the interactions between agency types and year are insignifi-
cant, and the above interactions with age remain intact. Therefore, Model 2
represents our best model.
Technical dimension
For this dimension too, age, age2 are significant predictors, while year is not
(Table 3). This is not surprising as the technical dimension is quite flat
Table 3. Technical dimension.
Dependent variable:
































Decision-making × Year 0.029
(0.036)
Enforcement × Year 0.019
(0.052)






















N agencies 20 20 20
Observations 335 335 335
Log Likelihood −93.348 −89.192 −88.826
Akaike Inf. Crit. 202.697 202.384 205.653
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 233.210 248.154 259.051
Note: *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
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across time – it remains high throughout, in line with our theoretical expec-
tation and the descriptive demonstration in Figure 1. Age has a positive
effect, whereas age2 has a negative one suggesting, as was the case with
the performative dimension, that the technical dimension increases with age,
but that the increase is slowing down as agencies age.
The coefficients of decision-making and enforcement agencies are nega-
tive, but not statistically significant. This entails that, on average, the advisory
agencies in our sample were more likely, as expected, to emphasise the tech-
nical dimension in their annual reports, yet the differences are relatively small
and cannot be generalised with sufficient confidence, to support our theoreti-
cal expectation. For the interaction models (Models 2 and 3) none of the inter-
actions are significant so our best model is Model 1.
Moral dimension
For the moral dimension, time (year) is a significant predictor and has a posi-
tive effect (Online Appendix, Table 8). Again, this is a very small dimension
across all agencies and one that remains very flat throughout. Enforcement
agencies appear to address this dimension less than advisory agencies to
start with and even to a lesser extent as these agencies age (as evidenced
by the significant interaction between enforcement and age in Model 3), an
unanticipated effect.
Discussion and conclusion
This study aimed to contribute to EU agency governance scholarship by
addressing critical – but thus far – understudied questions in the context of
the European regulatory state: How does the communication of different
aspects of organisational reputation vary over time and across EU agencies?
Can different regulatory roles account for differences in organisational repu-
tation cultivation strategies? Do such efforts at self-presentation and legitima-
tion diverge from the logic of the EU regulatory state? Are organisational
considerations and pressures leading agencies to depart from the tenants
of the EU regulatory state?
To address these questions, we carried out a quantitative analysis of EU
regulatory agencies’ annual reports across time. We aimed to contribute to,
and respond to calls from, reputation literature that ‘[a] critical feature of
moving forward in this research is to examine not only the various dimensions
of reputation, but also to assess their persistence and variability within and
across administrative contexts’ (Carpenter and Krause 2012: 31). It is precisely
their persistence and variability – across historical time, agencies’ life-cycles,
multiple organisational contexts and in a so far understudied administrative
context from a reputational perspective (i.e., EU regulatory governance) –
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that was the focus of this study. More generally, the study also contributes to
reputation literature by devising a systematic approach to quantitatively oper-
ationalise and measure reputational dimensions through the study of regulat-
ory communications. Our dictionary approach is deductive and a possible
shortcoming refers to the exhaustiveness of the dictionary. Future work
could corroborate and/or contrast our approach to for instance, more induc-
tive approaches, such as topic modelling, or to theoretically-guided manual
coding approaches – the latter possibly followed by applying machine learn-
ing techniques to this coded (training) data and using the ensuing model to
predict on new data.
The empirical findings provide support for our first three expectations
regarding the organisational reputation dimension trends. First, we observe
that consistently over time, from one year to the next, EU agencies predomi-
nantly focus on the technical dimension. Second, as expected, the data
suggests that the moral dimension is engaged with least by EU agencies
and it remains the least pronounced dimension for all agencies. Third, there
is a perceptible move over time from agencies’ original focus on technical
reputation towards a broader reputational outlook. While the main emphasis,
beyond technical, is on the performative dimension, we find that time (year)
has a positive effect on all three dimensions (i.e., performative, procedural,
moral). More generally, the broader focus towards performative aspects is
very interesting and could be reflective of broader NPM-type dynamics and
growing expectations placed over time on EU agencies linked to performance
measurement, performance reporting, and demonstrating efficiency. The
European Parliament, for instance, has been explicitly urging EU agencies in
its comments in its budgetary discharge reports along the years to supply
key performance indicators and information on actual results (Busuioc 2013).
The patterns of expansion in ‘reputation repertoire’ seem to hold not only
over time but also when examined from an agency age (‘life-cycle’) perspec-
tive but with a small quadratic effect. The quadratic effect of agency age in this
context appears to lend support to a life-cycle perspective: the technical and
performative dimensions increase with age (suggestive of the expected
expansion to other sources of legitimation, beyond technical), but the
increase in both slows down slightly as agencies mature (the opposite
occurs with the procedural dimension). The differentiated effects of age and
year are interesting here and potentially indicative of different micro-mechan-
isms at stake: i.e., a life-cycle versus an isomorphic logic that could be explored
more in depth in further studies.
Finally, our expectations regarding agency task are only partially met. We
do find support for the expectation that enforcement agencies emphasise
the performative dimension significantly more than advisory agencies. Interest-
ingly, our analysis additionally reveals that young enforcement agencies also
focus on the procedural dimension, but this emphasis diminishes with age.
JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY 19
While decision-making agencies are not more likely than advisory to emphasise
the performative dimension, they are more likely, as expected, to emphasise
the procedural dimension. Advisory agencies do not focus significantly more
on the technical dimension.
The broad reputation-management trends encountered are consistent
with the long-standing claim that the EU regulatory state is predominantly
focused on output legitimation strategies (Majone 1998), encompassing
both technical and performative aspects. As discussed above, in the regulat-
ory state discourse, EU non-majoritarian agencies are legitimated through
their technical outputs: through injecting expertise in the EU policy-making
processes, they are to improve the effectiveness of policy outcomes. Their
technical character, however, has direct implications for (the quality of)
their outputs: ‘efficiency orientated policies (…) are basically legitimated by
results, and hence may be delegated to such [non-majoritarian] institutions’
(Majone 1998: 28). Technical goes hand-in-hand with performative within
the EU regulatory state and, thus, it makes sense – within the logic of the
EU regulatory state – that the emphasis on the technical dimension, would
over time, broaden out to an emphasis on performative aspects. The focus
on input legitimacy through process (i.e., the procedural dimension) comes
in as well but more as an after-thought, while moral and re-distributive
matters are strictly outside the purview of the regulatory state.
Thus, while our findings indicate that EU agencies are becoming more stra-
tegic over time by diversifying their reputational repertoire, this expansion is
consistent with (/within the confines of) the tenants of the regulatory state.
While it appears EU agencies become more reputationally-astute and over
time expand their toolbox of reputational strategies, they are tentative political
entrepreneurs. Agency communications remain for the most part aligned with
the regulatory state discourse: while moving away from a ‘strict’ emphasis in
their early days on the communication of technical aspects, they remain
skewed towards legitimation strategies that emphasise the core features of
the EU regulatory state. Rather than boldly venturing into ‘moral’ legitimation
grounds, their communication efforts have expanded into performative
aspects, consistent with the EU’s regulatory state output legitimation criteria
for its regulators. EU regulators remain faithful to the technical emphasis of
the regulatory state but are simultaneously broadening out their political
roles. With time, they seem to have become attuned to the fact that the
areas they operate in are politicised and require a level of reputation-manage-
ment to sustain trust from one’s environment.
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